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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to UCA 78-2a-3.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issues
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in not setting aside the default

judgment?
2.

Did the district court err in relying on Appellee's testimony that

immediately after the incident, Appellant admitted liability for the incident?
3.

Did the district court err in awarding damages in a medical malpractice

action without a basis in expert evidence?
Standards of Review
The Motion to Set Aside should be reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard.
However, the district court's discretion in rejection the motion to set aside is not as
broad as its discretion in entering the default. Lund v Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah
2000)(citing 11 Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2857, at 257-58 (2d ed.
1995)).
"To sustain a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must demonstrate '(1) the
standard of care by which the [physician's] conduct is to be measured, (2) breach of that
standard by the [physician], (3) injury that was proximately caused by the physician's
negligence, and (4) damages. . . . 'Because of the complex issues involved in a . . .
medical malpractice case,' the plaintiff is required to prove the standard of care and
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proximate cause through expert testimony." Sohm v. Dixie Eye Center, 166 P.3d 614,
619 (Utah 2007). Findings of fact are reviewed on a clearly erroneous standard, while
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, without deference to the district court.
Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 54 P.3d 1177, 1181 (Utah 2002).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
UCA 78-14-18
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
The underlying case is a medical malpractice case. The Plaintiff brought the
action against the defendants, including the Appellant, for damages purportedly arising
from a laser hair removal incident. The Appellant denied the allegations in her original
Answer. After the Answer was filed, and while the Appellant was represented by prior
counsel, the Appellee issued discovery requests. Those discovery requests were not
timely answered by the Appellant. The Appellant's prior counsel withdrew as counsel in
August 2007. In August 2007, the court ruled that Appellant's prior counsel acted
improperly and in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct in failing to respond to
discovery. The Appellant represented herself, pro se, from August to September 2007,
when her Answer was stricken and default was entered due to the Appellant's failure to
respond to outstanding discovery.

After an evidentiary hearing, the Appellee was
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awarded $66,213.07. The Appellant filed a Motion to Set Aside the Default and a
IVtotion for a New Trial, which were rejected by the court. Thereafter, the Appellant
filed the appeal.
Statement of Facts
1.

The court issued a minute entry on August 29, 2007 finding that Appellant's prior
counsel, at a minimum, violated the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct by
failing to comply with the court's orders and rules (Rule 3.4(c)), failure to
respond to discovery (Rule 3.4(d)), and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice (Rule 8.4(d)). (Rec. 511)

2.

On September 21, 2007, after Appellant's prior counsel had withdrawn in August
2007, and while Appellant was acting pro se, the court struck the Appellant's
Answer for failure to cooperate with discovery, and entered the Appellant's
default. (Rec. 516).

3.

An evidentiary hearing was held on January 14, 2008 to establish damages. (Rec.
571).

4.

No expert testimony was submitted at the evidentiary hearing. (Rec. 644-649).

5.

On January 17, 2008, the court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order explicitly relying on evidence of a conversation in which Appellant
purportedly admitted liability to the Appellee. (Rec. 645).

6.

On February 5, 2008, entered an amendment to the final judgment. (Rec. 658660).
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7.

On February 19, 2008, the Appellant timely filed her Motion to Set Aside Default
and Motion for New Trial. (Rec. 661-666).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court's rejection of the Appellant's Motion to Set Aside and Motion

for a New Trial was an abuse of discretion. The Motion to Set Aside was timely filed, it
provided reasonable justification for the failure to act which resulted in the default, and
it established doubt as to the appropriateness of the default. The Motion to Set Aside
showed that prior counsel improperly failed to respond to discovery, and also violated
three separate rules of professional conduct. At the time the default was entered, not
only was the Appellant representing herself pro se, but the merits of the case had yet to
be heard. Additionally, the district court's discretion is limited when considering a
Motion to Set Aside, particularly when the merits have not been fully considered. Under
such circumstances, and under such limited discretion, the district court abused its
discretion in not setting aside the default judgment.
Secondly, the court erred when it issued its order subsequent to the January 8,
2008 evidentiary hearing. Based upon the testimony of Appellee, Appellee's friend, and
Appellee's husband, the court awarded medical expenses and pain and suffering of
$66,213.07. The Appellee testified that the Appellants admitted liability immediately
after the incident occurred. The district court specifically cited this testimony as a
Finding of Fact supporting its award of $66,213.07. In doing so, the district court
violated UCA 78-14-18, which specifically makes inadmissible
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"any unsworn statement, affirmation, gesture, or conduct made
to the patient by the defendant . . . if it: (a) expresses: (i) apology,
sympathy, commiseration, condolence, or compassion; or (ii) a general
sense of benevolence; or (b) describes: (i) the sequence of events
relating to the unanticipated outcome of medical care; (ii) the
significance of events; or (iii) both."
By admitting and relying on testimony in direct violation of UCA 78-14-18, and
in relying on the same, court abused its discretion.
Thirdly, the court erred in awarding damages in a medical malpractice case
without relying on expert evidence to establish reasonableness and necessity, which is
required under Utah law. Jensen v IHC Hospitals, Inc., 82 P.3d 1076, 1095-1096 (Utah
2003|).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED
THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE.
Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition attempted to frame the issue on

appeal as to whether the district court abused its discretion in entering the default. That
is not the issue. The issue on appeal is whether the court abused its discretion in
rejecting the Appellant's Motion to Set Aside, which was filed 10 days after the default
had been entered. The distinction is important because the court's discretion in entering
the default differed from the discretion it had in rejecting the Motion to Set Aside.
While the court may have been justified in entering the default, the court was not
justified in rejecting the Motion to Set Aside after being apprised of information making
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the default inappropriate.

Specifically, the Appellant justified her previous failures

which had led to the default. It was an abuse of discretion for the district court to ignore
this information and refuse to set aside the default.
A.

Under the Circumstances, the Appellant's Acts Were "Reasonably
Justified," Warranting Vacating the Default.

Under Utah law, default judgments should be allowed to stand only under certain
circumstances. Most importantly, the court has explained that default judgments:
are not favored in the law, especially where a party has timely responded
with challenging pleadings. When that has been done some caution should
be observed to see that the party is not taken advantage of. Speaking
generally about such problems, it is to be kept in mind that access to the
courts for the protection of rights and the settlement of disputes is one of
the most important factors in the maintenance of a peaceable and wellordered society. . . .
The uniformally acknowledged policy of the law is to accord litigants the
opportunity for a hearing on the merits, where that can be done without
serious injustice to the other party. To that end, the courts are generally
indulgent toward the setting aside of default judgments where there is a
reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and
where timely application is made to set it aside. Consistent with the
objective just stated, where there is doubt about whether a default should
be set aside, the doubt should be resolved in favor of doing so, to the end
that each party may have an opportunity to present his side of the
controversy and that there be a resolution in accordance with law and
justice.
Interstate Excavating Inc., v Agla Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369, 371(Utah 1980)(Emphasis
added). According to the Utah Supreme Court, the Appellant was required to meet two
requirements after the default was entered. First, the Appellant was required to timely
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respond by challenging the default. Second, the Appellant must show, in that challenge,
a reasonable justification to excuse the failure to act which led to the default. The
Appellant met both of these requirements. Appellant filed a timely Motion to Set Aside.
The bases for the Motion to Set Aside "reasonably justified]" the Appellant's failures,
and thereby created a doubt as to the appropriateness of the default. The court abused its
discretion in not setting aside the default.
Utah courts have explained that a court's discretion to deny a motion to set aside
is more limited than its discretion to grant it, particularly where the movant's case has
not been fully considered. Lund v Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000)(citing 11 Wright et
al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2857, at 257-58 (2d ed. 1995)(stating, "There is
much more reason for liberality in reopening a judgment when the merits of the case
never have been considered than there is when the judgment comes after a full trial on
the merits. Based on the remedial nature of Rule 60(b), the discretion of the district
court to deny a motion for relief is limited.")). The district court abused its discretion in
refusing to set aside the default, despite the fact that 1) the merits of the case had never
been considered, 2) a timely challenge had been filed, and 3) there was "reasonable
justification" for "doubt" as to whether the default should be set aside.
Finally, Utah courts are generally "lenient with pro se litigants. Individuals have a
right to represent themselves without being compelled to seek professional assistance.
Where they are largely strangers to the legal system, courts are understandably loath to
sanction them for a procedural misstep here or there." Lundahl v. Quinn, 67 P.3d 1000,
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1002 (2003). The Appellant had been acting pro se since August 2007. Her Answer
was stricken by the court in September 2007. As a stranger to the legal system, the court
should have been lenient with the Appellant's failure to respond. Instead of affording
such leniency, the court struck the Answer and entered the default.
i.

The Appellant's Challenge was Timely

The Motion to Set Aside challenged the court's default arguing that the
Appellant's failures to act in discovery were justified. The final judgment was amended
on February 5, 2008. The Motion to Set Aside was timely filed on February 19, 2008,
10 working days after it was entered.
ii.

"Reasonable Justification" Was Shown Through Evidence of
Counsel Misconduct or Negligence.

The Motion to Set Aside should have been granted because it was "reasonably
justified]" by the circumstances, as evidenced by the district court's own prior ruling. In
addition to the fact that the Appellant had been acting pro se for only a matter of weeks
before the court struck the Answer and entered her default, the failure to provide
discovery was overwhelmingly the consequence of prior counsel's failure to act. Such
is not merely an allegation, but is established by the district court's own ruling in August
2007. The district court found that, at a minimum, Appellant's prior counsel violated
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to comply with the courts orders and
rules (Rule 3.4(c)), failure to respond to discovery (Rule 3.4(d)), and engaging in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (Rule 8.4(d)). (Rec. 511).
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Counsel misconduct or negligence has been held sufficient to justify setting aside
a default. See Interstate Excavating Inc. Based on this established case law and the fact
that it was Appellant's prior counsel that was overwhelmingly at fault for the discovery
failures, there was "reasonable justification" for the Appellant's failures. Interstate
Excavating Inc., at 371.

The "reasonable justification" was sufficient to at least

establish "doubt about whether a default should be set aside." Id. Under Utah law, that
doubt should have been resolved by setting aside the default judgment. Id.
The existence of "reasonable justification" sufficient to establish "doubt" is
particularly apparent, as explained above, in light of the facts that 1) the court's
discretion is limited when considering motions to set aside, 2) the Appellant was a pro
se litigant when the default was entered, and 3) the merits of the case had not been
reached. Under such circumstances, the rejection of the Motion to Set Aside was an
abuse of discretion.
II.

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY VIOLATING UCA 78-1418.
The evidentiary hearing held on January 8, 2008 and involved testimony from

Appellee. Appellee testified as follows:
Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.

Okay. So tell us what happened that day.
. . . I went to the clinic for my scheduled treatment. Linda
[Appellee] was really busy that day. . . . she said she was gonna
have Renette start me, get me ready.
And who is Renette?
Her daughter.
Okay. Did she start you?
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A.
Q
A,
Q
A,
Q
A

She prepped me and then Linda said she wanted her to start the
laser treatment so she did, in fact, start the treatments.
Okay. Then, then what happened?
It was, it was burning a little bit. . . and Renette did my left arm and
started on my right arm and then Linda came in and took over.
Okay, and then after Linda took over, what happened?
She retreated my right arm. . . I told her it was hurting. . . I told her
Renette already did it. . .
Okay. Then what happened?
Then she moved on to start treating my legs. My arms started to get
really red. . . I was in a lot of pain. . . and my left aim started to
blister. . . Renette wasn't in the room at the time because she'd left
when Linda took over. Renetter came back in and looked at my
arms and said, "Oh my God, did I do that?" And Linda said, "No, I
did."

(January 18, 2008 Transcript, pgs. 10-11).

Based upon this specific testimony of

Appellee, the court awarded $66,213.07 against the Defendant.

(Rec. 648). This

testimony evidence, however, is conversation between the Appellee and Appellant in
which Appellee claims Appellant admitted liability for medical malpractice. UCA 7814-18 specifically makes inadmissible "any unsworn statement, affirmation, gesture, or
conduce made to the patient by the defendant . . . if it: (a) expresses: (i) apology,
sympathy, commiseration, condolence, or compassion; or (ii) a general sense of
benevolence; or (b) describes: (i) the sequence of events relating to the unanticipated
outcome of medical care; (ii) the significance of events; or (iii) both." By admitting
such conversation as evidence, by including it as a Finding of Fact, and by relying on it
as a basis for the award, the district court acted in direct violation of UCA 78-14-18.
The district court thereby abused its discretion.
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III.

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO RELY ON
EXPERT TESTIMONY.
Under Utah law "to prove medical malpractice, a plaintiff must establish '(1) the

standard of care by which the (physician's) conduct is to be measured, (2) breach of that
standard by the (physician),' (3) injury that was proximately caused by the physician's
negligence, and (4) damages. Jensen v IHC Hospitals, Inc., 82 P.3d 1076, 1095-1096
(Utah 2003). Further, "[u]nless 'the propriety of the treatment received is within the
common knowledge and experience of the layman,' the plaintiff is required to prove the
standard of care through an expert witness who is qualified to testify about the
standard."

Additionally, the subsequent determination of damages must likewise be

based upon expert testimony, rather than mere speculation of lay persons.

Sohm v.

Dixie Eye Center, 166 P.3d 614 (Utah App. 2007). "Because of the complex issues
involved in a . . . medical malpractice case," the plaintiff is required to prove the
standard of care and proximate cause through expert testimony." Id., at 619. Only after
expert evidence has been introduced to establish the standard of care and proximate
cause may the matter be submitted for the determination of damages. See Beard v. KMart Corp., 12 P.3d 1215, 1019-1020 (Utah App. 2000). "Without the required expert
medical opinion linking the injury to the necessity of the [medical treatment], a jury
would simply be speculating about a linkage that is beyond its knowledge and
experience. The expert medical testimony

merely

established

a

chronological

relationship between the accident and her symptoms. No expert medical testimony was
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received that the [medical treatment] w[as] necessitated by her accident." Id. at 1021.
Lacking the necessary expert evidence, the damages award in the case at bar was purely
speculative.

Medical expenses which were ordered as part of the Judgment were

hearsay, incompetent and should have been excluded.
The Appellee failed to provide any expert evidence upon which the court could
find that the standard of care had been breached, and consequently, the damages
awarded were purely speculative.

By issuing its order in the complete absence of

required expert evidence, the district court abused its discretion and committed error.
CONCLUSION
This matter has never been heard on the merits.

The court entered an order

striking the Answer and entering default against the Appellant at a time the Appellant
was representing herself pro-se for the first time during litigation.

The delay in

answering discovery, which led to the striking of the Answer and the entering of the
default, was the result of prior counsel's misconduct.

Such was even formally

recognized by the district court. Under such circumstances, the Appellant's failure to
respond to discovery was reasonably justified, and therefore, sufficient to make the
appropriateness of the default doubtful. To refuse to set aside the default under such
circumstances was an abuse of discretion.
The court also erred in basing its judgment upon testimony that the Appellant
immediately admitted liability for the alleged injury.
directly contradicts UCA 78-14-18.
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Reliance on such testimony

Finally, the court incorrectly entered judgment without expert testimony as
required under Utah law. There was no evidence upon which the court court could find
that the standard of care had been breached, and no evidence that would make damages
anything other than pure speculation.
DATED THIS

f/

day of September, 2008.

PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL, PC

Theodore E. Kanell
Attorney for Defendant, Linda R. Hensley
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ADDENDUM

No addendum is needed.
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